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Open Verification

Draw Verification

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Provably fair — cryptographic Draw complete

Draw complete — independently verifiable

This draw used a cryptographic commitment scheme. The draw secret was generated before ticket sales began, its sha256 hash (the commitment hash) was published, and the secret was only revealed after the draw. This proves the winner selection could not have been influenced by ticket sales.

Draw Result

Winner
Winner, Derbyshire
Winning ticket
#208
Entries in pool
5 (all entrants)
Winner index
2 (0-based)
Draw executed
16 Aug 2026, 8:31 AM
Entropy source
secrets.SystemRandom (instant-win positions at setup)
Fairness mechanism
SHA-256 commit-reveal — selection by sha256(legion-draw-v1:draw:draw_secret:pool_hash:drand_randomness:counter) rejection sampling

How This Result Was Produced

7 steps, each one checkable against the values published below. Nothing here depends on trusting us — every input is shown.

Verify commitment was published before the draw

This sha256 hash was published when the competition was created. It proves the draw_secret could not have been changed after tickets were sold.

be9daaf12253d86b0a6f62be986a3cab5b9fb8e78226707c89f0995599c68f29

Verify the pool-freeze commitment was published before the beacon round

sha256 of the exact UTF-8 string 'legion-draw-v1:pool_freeze:' + pool_hash + ':' + drand_chain_hash + ':' + str(round_number) — colon-separated, no spaces, no trailing newline. Published before the targeted round resolved, it pins both the entry pool and the round while the round's randomness was still unknowable. Rebuild it from this page's published values with the command below.

98d6c8bbea292831d48d3e8753570fe7b90fbc8b17dc4f6393383da8e6d19dca 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha256('legion-draw-v1:pool_freeze:51de679a9cffcc8cd859ee2f0aec23bed08be3175beb48e7cea080089118ea92:52db9ba70e0cc0f6eaf7803dd07447a1f5477735fd3f661792ba94600c84e971:31354044'.encode()).hexdigest())"

Verify draw_secret matches commitment_hash

The draw_secret is revealed below. sha256(draw_secret) is shown — it must equal the commitment_hash in step 1.

draw_secret (input)

4f9c0bfea72f3145edd234f53ef5ca0b0d468dc4c36a6c1c7b2752cf3d610cbe

sha256(draw_secret) must equal step 1

be9daaf12253d86b0a6f62be986a3cab5b9fb8e78226707c89f0995599c68f29

Verify the entry pool hash

sha256 of every ticket number in the draw pool, in ascending numeric order, joined with commas and no spaces.

51de679a9cffcc8cd859ee2f0aec23bed08be3175beb48e7cea080089118ea92

Verify the drand beacon randomness

Round 31354044 of the public drand randomness beacon (chain 52db9ba70e0cc0f6eaf7803dd07447a1f5477735fd3f661792ba94600c84e971). This value is published independently by multiple operators and could not have been known when the pool above was frozen. Check it yourself: fetch https://api.drand.sh/52db9ba70e0cc0f6eaf7803dd07447a1f5477735fd3f661792ba94600c84e971/public/31354044, hex-decode the response's 'signature' field into raw bytes, then compute sha256 of those bytes — it must match the value shown here. (Hashing the ASCII hex text of the signature instead of the decoded bytes gives a different, wrong answer.) The command below does exactly that.

9a39a2f3a6ce1f8a1fde7ef0b201002e602c6fa1d89b8228c3ef74ec520d4064 
python3 -c "import hashlib, json, urllib.request; r = json.load(urllib.request.urlopen('https://api.drand.sh/52db9ba70e0cc0f6eaf7803dd07447a1f5477735fd3f661792ba94600c84e971/public/31354044')); print(hashlib.sha256(bytes.fromhex(r['signature'])).hexdigest())"

Verify the beacon's BLS signature

Before accepting the randomness above, the platform checked drand's BLS12-381 signature for this round against this chain public key — a relay can withhold a round but cannot forge one without drand's private key. Fetch the round's 'signature' field from the URL above and verify e(H(round_bytes), public_key) == e(signature, G2_generator) yourself with any BLS12-381 library; source: https://drand.love/developer/http-api/.

83cf0f2896adee7eb8b5f01fcad3912212c437e0073e911fb90022d3e760183c8c4b450b6a0a6c3ac6a5776a2d1064510d1fec758c921cc22b0e17e63aaf4bcb5ed66304de9cf809bd274ca73bab4af5a6e9c76a4bc09e76eae8991ef5ece45a

Reproduce the winner selection (rejection sampling)

Starting at counter=0, compute sha256(f'legion-draw-v1:draw:{draw_secret}:{pool_hash}:{drand_randomness}:{counter}') as a 256-bit integer. Let limit be the largest multiple of N below 2^256. If the value is >= limit, increment counter and retry. Otherwise winner_index = value mod N.

counter=0, winner_index=2

Check It Yourself

Run every check in your own browser. It recomputes the hashes and the winner selection locally from the values published on this page, and fetches the drand round directly from the public relays — nothing is sent to our servers, so a pass cannot depend on trusting us.

  1. Confirm sha256(draw_secret) equals the commitment hash in step 1.
  2. Confirm the sha256 of the entry pool below equals the pool hash in step 3. Hash the text exactly as shown — ticket numbers in ascending numeric order, separated by commas, with no spaces and no trailing newline.

    Entry pool — ticket numbers in ascending numeric order

    73,97,208,668,700
  3. Run the pre-filled command below to reproduce the beacon-seeded rejection-sampling winner index (counter=?, expected winner_index=2). This folds in the drand beacon randomness from the step above alongside the draw secret and pool hash, so the winner could not have been known until that round resolved. 
    python3 - <<'PY'
import hashlib
draw_secret = '4f9c0bfea72f3145edd234f53ef5ca0b0d468dc4c36a6c1c7b2752cf3d610cbe'
pool_hash = '51de679a9cffcc8cd859ee2f0aec23bed08be3175beb48e7cea080089118ea92'
beacon_randomness = '9a39a2f3a6ce1f8a1fde7ef0b201002e602c6fa1d89b8228c3ef74ec520d4064'
total_entries = 5
counter = 0
limit = (1 << 256) - ((1 << 256) % total_entries)
while True:
    seed = hashlib.sha256(f'legion-draw-v1:draw:{draw_secret}:{pool_hash}:{beacon_randomness}:{counter}'.encode()).digest()
    candidate = int.from_bytes(seed[:32], 'big')
    if candidate < limit:
        print(f'counter={counter} winner_index={candidate % total_entries}')
        break
    counter += 1
PY

Full Entry List

All sold tickets with entry method (no personal names). This competition had no engagement question, so the file carries no answer column. Download it to cross-reference ticket numbers against the draw pool; the "In Main Draw" column marks which rows formed it.

Download entry list CSV

Independent Timestamp Proof

Each commitment hash is anchored to the Bitcoin blockchain via OpenTimestamps. A confirmed proof establishes the hash existed before the Bitcoin block that attests it — checkable without trusting our records. Save the commitment hash to a file and check the proof with the free ots tool: printf '%s' 'COMMITMENT_HASH' > commitment.txt && ots verify -f commitment.txt proof.ots

Draw commitment — anchoring in progress

be9daaf12253d86b0a6f62be986a3cab5b9fb8e78226707c89f0995599c68f29

Instant win commitment — anchoring in progress

e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855

Pool freeze commitment — anchoring in progress

98d6c8bbea292831d48d3e8753570fe7b90fbc8b17dc4f6393383da8e6d19dca

What this proof does and does not show: Bitcoin confirmation takes hours, while the targeted drand round resolves seconds after the pool freeze — so a confirmed proof here demonstrates the pool-freeze commitment existed before its attesting block, not that the freeze happened before the drand round. The freeze-before-round ordering rests on the commitment having been published before the round resolved (step 2 above) and on our audit records.